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The Indirect Response to the Foreknowledge Argument 
 
Among John Martin Fischer’s principal aims in Our Fate (2016) is to develop and defend an 
argument for the incompatibility of divine foreknowledge and human freedom to do otherwise 
based on the notion of the fixity of the past. I’ll call this argument the “incompatibility 
argument.” The bulk of Fischer’s defense of the incompatibility argument involves responding to 
objections to the argument which attempt to show that a particular premise or supposition of the 
argument is false or question-begging. In the rather different case of Fischer’s engagement with 
Molinism, his aim is to expose Molinist “responses” to the argument as pseudo-responses, as 
their truth is utterly irrelevant to evaluating the argument. 
 My concern here will be with an entirely different response to the incompatibility 
argument, one which does not focus on objecting to any particular premise or supposition in the 
argument, but rather attempts to challenge the argument as a whole in an indirect manner. It is a 
response developed in my (2014) with which Fischer engages very briefly in the new 
introductory essay of his book (p.41). My primary purpose will be to develop the indirect 
response here in a way that interacts directly with central aspects of Fischer’s work and will 
provide him with an excellent opportunity to weigh in at greater length on its merits. 
 
1. The Indirect Response Presented 
The indirect response to the incompatibility argument begins with the uncontroversial 
observation that all versions of this argument are attempts to prove a conditional: that if God has 
exhaustive and infallible foreknowledge, then no human person is able to do otherwise than what 
she does.  
The next step of the indirect response is to highlight something else that must be true if 
this conditional is to be true: namely, that God’s having exhaustive and infallible foreknowledge 
requires the existence of something which explains why it is that no human person is able to do 
otherwise than what she does. The motivation for this claim is as follows. Those who defend the 
incompatibility argument do not (and should not) wed their defense of this argument to the view 
that the ability to do otherwise is intrinsically impossible. Instead, defenders of the 
incompatibility argument aim to show that, granting that the ability to do otherwise is 
intrinsically possible, God’s having exhaustive and infallible foreknowledge would render it 
impossible. Divine foreknowledge and the ability to do otherwise are not compossible. But, once 
it is granted that the ability to do otherwise is intrinsically possible, there is considerable pressure 
to affirm that if it does not obtain, something explains why it doesn’t obtain. Otherwise we are 
left claiming that there is no explanation for why things that could have obtained don’t—an 
unfortunate commitment for a defense of any argument to require. If we grant this—that if no 
person has the ability to do otherwise, then something explains why this is so—then it will 
follow that every version of the incompatibility argument is committed to the claim that God’s 
foreknowledge requires the existence of something that explains why no human person has the 
ability to do otherwise. For, every version of the incompatibility argument is committed to the 
conditional that if God has exhaustive and infallible foreknowledge, then the ability to do 
otherwise doesn’t exist; and our argument here has provided reason for thinking that if this 
ability doesn’t exist, there’s an explanation for why it doesn’t; so, every version of the 
incompatibility argument is committed to the claim that God’s foreknowledge requires the 
existence of something that explains why no human person is able to do otherwise. 
 The third and final step of the indirect response is to challenge the claim that God’s 
having exhaustive and infallible foreknowledge does require the existence of something that 
explains why no human person has the ability to do otherwise (hereafter, “the requirement 
claim”). Challenges to this claim may come in varying degrees of strength. For example, one 
might challenge the claim by arguing that we are not in a position to know that it is true, or by 
arguing that we are in a position to know that it is false. And there are various other degrees of 
strength imaginable. 
 Regardless of the strength of the challenge one wishes to urge against the requirement 
claim, my suggestion has been to develop the challenge by ruling out the best candidates for 
what could fulfill the role it specifies. That is, my suggestion has been to attempt to show that for 
each of the best candidates for that which could be both required by divine foreknowledge and 
could explain why no human person can do otherwise, there is significant reason to doubt that 
this candidate in fact is both required by divine foreknowledge and would explain why human 
persons cannot do otherwise. The best candidates, in my view, are the truth of God’s beliefs, the 
beliefs themselves, and the truth of causal determinism. I’ll conclude this section by offering 
strategies for arguing that none of these candidates fulfills the role specified by the requirement 
claim. In the process, I’ll be engaging with relevant work from Fischer’s book. I’ll also address 
two additional candidates I have not previously discussed that readers will recognize from 
Fischer’s work—the “fixity” of God’s beliefs, and God’s being in a “knowledge conferring 
situation.” 
 Start with the truth of God’s beliefs. The proposal here is that it is the truth of God’s 
beliefs that is both required by exhaustive and infallible divine foreknowledge and explains why 
no human person could do otherwise than she does. For example, if we suppose that Jones does 
X at T2, the proposal will have it that God’s exhaustive and infallible foreknowledge requires it 
to be the case that, at past times, it was true that Jones would do X at T2, and the fact that it was 
true at past times that Jones would do X at T2 explains why Jones cannot do otherwise than X at 
T2. I have argued (2014: ch.2) that this is a poor candidate for fulfilling the role specified by the 
requirement claim, because it is implausible that the truth of God’s past beliefs explains why 
human persons lack the ability to do otherwise. For example, it is implausible that the fact that it 
was true at past times that Jones would do X at T2 explains why Jones cannot do otherwise than 
X at T2. We can see why this is implausible by attending to the explanatory relationship between 
Jones’s doing X at T2 and it’s being true at past times that Jones would do X at T2, where the 
kind of explanation with which we are concerned is the kind that figures prominently in many of 
the discussions in Fischer’s book—a relation of metaphysical dependence that is asymmetric and 
transitive.1 There are four options regarding this explanatory relationship: either the past truth 
explains Jones’s doing X, Jones’s doing X explains the past truth, there is a common explanation 
for both the past truth and Jones’s doing X, or there is no explanatory relationship between the 
two. I’ve argued in my (2014: ch.2) that only the second and third options are plausible, and that 
the third would imply that if anything, something other than past truth explains the absence of 
the ability to do otherwise. Thus, all that is left is the second option; and, notably, in his 
comments about the nature of soft facts, Fischer appears happy to grant that this option is correct 
(pp.186, 191-2). He appears happy to grant, that is, that Jones’s doing X at T2 explains why it 
was true at past times that Jones would do X at T2. However, once this is granted, we can also 
see why it cannot be that the fact that it was true at past times that Jones would do X at T2 
explains why Jones cannot do otherwise than X at T2. For, given that the relevant explanatory 
relations are transitive—something Fischer also appears ready to grant (pp.208-9)—it would 
follow that Jones’s doing X at T2 explains why Jones cannot do otherwise than X at T2. And this 
is something that the defender of the incompatibility argument, as we said above, should not 
want to maintain. It is tantamount to saying that the ability to do otherwise is intrinsically 
impossible. So, the truth of God’s past beliefs is not a good candidate for fulfilling the role 
specified by the requirement claim. 
 For very similar reasons, neither are God’s past beliefs good candidates for fulfilling the 
role specified by the requirement claim. The idea on this second suggestion would be that 
infallible divine foreknowledge requires past divine beliefs, and it is these that explain why 
human persons cannot do otherwise than what they do. For example, it is God’s past belief that 
Jones will do X at T2 that explains why Jones cannot do otherwise than X at T2. Notably, an 
argument paralleling that in the previous paragraph can be employed to show that past divine 
beliefs are not good candidates for fulfilling the role specified by the requirement claim, either. 
Again, focusing on the example of Jones, we can see this by attending to the explanatory 
relationship between God’s past beliefs that Jones will do X at T2 and Jones’s doing X at T2. 
Either God’s past beliefs explain why Jones does X, Jones’s doing X explains God’s past beliefs, 
God’s past beliefs and Jones’s doing X share a common explanation, or there is no explanatory 
relationship between God’s past beliefs and Jones’s doing X. Again, I’ve argued (2014: ch.2) 
that the only plausible views here are the second and third, and that the third would imply that, if 
anything, something other than God’s beliefs explains why no person can do otherwise. 
Moreover, again, in various places in his book Fischer appears prepared to grant that this second 
option is correct.2 That is, he appears prepared to grant that Jones’s doing X at T2 explains why 
God believed in the past that Jones would do X at T2. However, once this is granted, we can also 
                                                          
1 And so it is neither simply logical entailment nor counterfactual dependence. For Fischer’s discussion of it, see 
ch.1 and chs.9-12. 
2 See his statement that such a claim “seem(s) just fine (223).” Cf. p.221. 
see why God’s past beliefs cannot fulfill the role specified by the requirement claim. For, if they 
were to do so, it would again follow from the transitivity of explanation that Jones’s doing X at 
T2 explains why Jones cannot do otherwise than X at T2—something a defender of the 
incompatibility argument will not want to maintain.  
 A third candidate for fulfilling the role specified by the requirement claim is the truth of 
causal determinism. On this proposal, God’s possession of exhaustive and infallible 
foreknowledge requires the truth of causal determinism, and the truth of causal determinism 
explains why no person is able to do otherwise than what she does.  I have argued elsewhere 
(2014: ch.2) that the truth of causal determinism is in fact the best candidate for that which is 
both required by divine foreknowledge and would explain the absence of the ability to do 
otherwise. 
 Very interestingly, Fischer has himself provided reason for rejecting the truth of causal 
determinism as that which fulfills the role specified by the requirement claim. This is because he 
thinks that infallible foreknowledge does not require the truth of causal determinism. Indeed, by 
articulating his “bootstrapping” view of divine foreknowledge (pp.36-39), he offers an account 
of the mechanics whereby God might secure infallible foreknowledge without causal 
determinism being true. So, unless he is prepared to surrender the bootstrapping view and the 
more general point he wanted to employ it to defend—that infallible foreknowledge can be 
achieved in an indeterministic world—Fischer cannot endorse this third candidate. 
 While I cannot discuss the reasons here, I myself think that Fischer’s bootstrapping view 
is ultimately incoherent. Nevertheless, his attempt to articulate a way whereby infallible 
foreknowledge can be achieved without causal determinism being true does illustrate the kind of 
strategy I advocate for resisting this third candidate. The strategy I have advocated (2014: ch.3) 
involves disjoining what I call “conciliatory stories” about the mechanics of divine 
foreknowledge. These are accounts of how God achieves infallible foreknowledge without causal 
determinism being true that have a non-zero epistemic status. If there are enough such stories, 
and their epistemic statuses are high enough, they can present a considerable challenge to this 
third candidate. 
 Since I’m not optimistic about Fischer’s own conciliatory story, the reader might wonder 
what other stories I am more optimistic about. I’ll briefly mention a few. By doing so, I aim to 
highlight the widespread appeal of the indirect response.  
First, consider Molinism. As Fischer himself sees it (p.40), the aim of Molinists is 
precisely to provide an account of the mechanics of infallible divine foreknowledge that does not 
require causal determinism. Thus, to the extent that Molinism is an epistemic possibility, it can 
contribute to the indirect response. For this reason, I think Fischer’s arguments for the 
irrelevance of Molinism for assessing the incompatibility argument are too strong. Molinism is 
relevant, if employed as part of a defense of the indirect response. 
 Second, consider divine timelessness. Specifically, I am thinking of versions of divine 
timelessness which also affirm that God became incarnate in the past, and that God’s past beliefs 
are explained by God’s timeless beliefs (e.g., Rota 2010). On this sort of picture, Jones’s 
undetermined act X at T2 explains God’s timeless belief that Jones does X at T2, and God’s 
timeless belief that Jones does X at T2 explains the incarnate God’s past infallible belief that 
Jones will do X at T2. To the extent that this kind of picture is an epistemic possibility, it can 
contribute to the indirect response.  
 Besides these more well-known conciliatory stories, there are others. I have myself 
developed a time-ordering account of divine foreknowledge (2014: ch.4), Jonathan Kvanvig 
(2013) has articulated an account of “Philosphical Arminianism,” and some Thomists (e.g., 
Grant 2010) have attempted to provide accounts according to which God more directly controls 
our acts and thereby acquires foreknowledge of them, without this implying that these acts are 
causally determined. Altogether, these conciliatory stories present a considerable challenge to the 
claim that infallible divine foreknowledge requires the truth of causal determinism. 
 Turn finally to two additional candidates for that which fulfills the role specified by the 
requirement claim. First, consider the proposal that it is the fixity of God’s past beliefs that does 
the trick. God’s having infallible foreknowledge implies that God’s past beliefs are fixed, and his 
past beliefs being fixed explains why human persons cannot do otherwise than what they do. The 
problem I see with this approach is that, on Fischer’s view (pp.188, 231), the fixity of God’s past 
beliefs is a feature they have simply in virtue of their having the more fundamental feature of 
being past (in the sense of “past” operative in the principle of the fixity of the past). However, it 
is a plausible principle that if something X’s having feature F explains why P is so, and X has F 
in virtue of X having more fundamental feature F’, then X’s having F’ explains why P is so.3 It 
follows from this principle that if the fixity of God’s past beliefs explains why no human person 
can do otherwise than what she does, then God’s past beliefs themselves explain why no human 
person can do otherwise. Yet, we’ve already seen why it is problematic to maintain that God’s 
past beliefs explain why human persons cannot do otherwise.  
 A fifth and final candidate is suggested by what Fischer says about God being in a 
“knowledge conferring situation” (a KCS) in his defense of the bootstrapping view (pp.39-40). 
Fischer proposes that, just as human beings can have fallible knowledge of the future by virtue of 
believing claims about the future in the context of a KCS, God can be in this very same kind of 
KCS with respect to claims about the future. Of course, God can be in an even better quality of 
KCS than human knowers as well. In particular, Fischer endeavors to show that even in an 
indeterministic world, God can bootstrap himself to having infallible total evidence regarding the 
future by virtue of knowing his own beliefs and omniscience. For our purposes here, we are 
interested in evaluating the proposal that it is God’s being in a KCS with respect to claims about 
                                                          
3 See (Lange 2013). 
what human persons will do in the future that is both required by infallible divine foreknowledge 
and explains why human persons cannot do otherwise. 
 I think it is important to distinguish two different interpretations of this proposal. On one 
interpretation, the proposal is focusing exclusively on what is common between God’s KCS’s 
and human knowers’ KCS’s. On this interpretation, the proposal is that it is God’s being in the 
position of having fallible first-order evidence regarding what human persons will do that 
explains why they cannot do otherwise. Interpreted in this way, the proposal is not promising. 
For, the proposed explanans will not adequately predict the explanandum. God’s possession of 
fallible evidence regarding what human persons will do is not an adequate enough predictor of 
what human persons will do for it to explain why they cannot do otherwise. Indeed, it is perfectly 
consistent with them doing otherwise. 
 On a second interpretation of the proposal, we focus on the total package of God’s KCS, 
including not just whatever evidence God would share with fallible human knowers, but the 
evidence that enables God to have infallible foreknowledge. I offer a dilemma against this 
proposal. Either the evidence here is evidence provided by the truth of causal determinism, or it 
is not. If it is evidence provided by the truth of causal determinism, then the proposal is no 
different from the third proposal evaluated above. If, on the other hand, the evidence is evidence 
provided in some other way, then it is doubtful that this evidence will explain why human 
persons cannot do otherwise. For example, suppose the evidence is provided in the way proposed 
by Fischer’s bootstrapping view. Then, part of the evidence will be God’s own beliefs about 
what human persons will do. But, then, the proposal will be claiming that part of the explanation 
for why human persons cannot do otherwise is that God has past beliefs regarding what they will 
do. And this proposal will be subject to the same objection as the second proposal above. Thus, 
this fifth candidate is no better than the first three. As such, there is good reason to doubt the 
requirement claim. Consequently, there is good reason to doubt that the incompatibility argument 
is sound, even if we cannot identify exactly where it goes wrong. Notably, the reason provided is 
based on claims Fischer appears willing to grant. 
 
2. The Dialectical Situation 
For all the indirect response would appear to have going for it, might it be that it nonetheless 
merely leads to a dialectical stalemate? Fischer’s own brief engagement with the indirect 
response in his book (p.41) suggests he may be sympathetic with an affirmative answer. The 
thought is this. Suppose we grant that the incompatibility argument is sound only if divine 
foreknowledge requires something that explains why human persons cannot do otherwise. The 
project of the defender of the indirect response is to provide reasons for thinking that this 
requirement claim is not satisfied. However, the defense of the incompatibility argument should 
not be overlooked. This very defense itself provides reasons for thinking the requirement claim is 
met. So, what we are left with is reasons both for and against the requirement claim. And that is a 
stalemate. 
I think this suggestion is correct in that, to the extent that the premises and suppositions 
of the incompatibility argument are defensible, this provides reasons in favor of the requirement 
claim. Moreover, if all that an advocate of the indirect response was to do was to defend the 
indirect response in the manner I have above, and if the reasons she offered in the process of this 
defense were no stronger than the reasons provided by defenders of the incompatibility 
argument, then I think we would have an irrevocable stalemate (not to say this would be an 
uninteresting conclusion!). However, my view is that a defender of the indirect response should 
not merely defend the indirect response in the way I have above. Rather, she should couple that 
defense with direct criticisms of the incompatibility argument that challenge key claims made in 
its defense. She should aim to expose perhaps several potentially problematic features of the 
incompatibility argument without needing to insist that her criticisms of any particular feature 
are devastating; and, in addition, she should go on to present the indirect response which 
provides additional reason for thinking that the incompatibility argument goes wrong somewhere 
or other.  
What kinds of direct criticisms of the incompatibility argument might be offered? I’ll 
briefly identify two. First, Fischer’s preferred regimentation of the principle of the fixity of the 
past has it that hard-type soft past facts are part of the “past” in the relevant sense, and so must 
remain fixed in any world accessible from the actual world (pp.26-31). But, this will imply that 
the fact that a certain inscription saying that Jones does X at T2 was true a thousand years ago is 
part of the “past” in the relevant sense, and so must remain fixed when we consider what Jones 
can do. This is because various properties of the inscription, such as it’s being an inscription, are 
hard features of it, just like God’s belief that Jones does X at T2 has the hard feature of being a 
belief, on Fischer’s view. Yet, the resulting fatalistic consequences of true past inscriptions are 
not consequences Fischer wishes to wed himself to in the context of defending the 
incompatibility argument (e.g., p.195, note 30). Second, Fischer’s defense of the claim that 
God’s past beliefs are “past” in the sense of being soft past facts with hard features relies upon a 
questionable view of properties: namely, that when God holds beliefs at past times, God 
possesses the very same property that is possessed by human believers when they hold beliefs—
viz., the property of having a belief (p.30). This view will be denied, however, by many who 
think that properties are particulars and who would maintain, for example, that in each instance 
in which God holds a belief in the past, he exemplifies a distinct property—the property of 
having this particular divine belief, or that one, etc. It is highly questionable whether these latter 
properties are hard. 
These objections illustrate that central claims in Fischer’s defense of the incompatibility 
argument are questionable, even if no knock-down argument can be given against them. When 
coupled with a defense of the indirect response as presented above, this puts considerable 
pressure on an advocate of the incompatibility argument. It’s far for clear we have a dialectical 
stalemate here; and, even if we do, it needn’t remain this way. There is a rich future discussion to 
be had about the incompatibility argument, and the indirect response should be an important part 
of that discussion. 
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